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Abstract
For portfolio choice problems with proportional transaction costs, we discuss whether
or not there exists a shadow price, i.e., a least favorable frictionless market extension
leading to the same optimal strategy and utility.
By means of an explicit counter-example, we show that shadow prices may fail to
exist even in seemingly perfectly benign situations, i.e., for a log-investor trading in an
arbitrage-free market with bounded prices and arbitrarily small transaction costs.
We also clarify the connection between shadow prices and duality theory. Whereas
dual minimizers need not lead to shadow prices in the above “global” sense, we show
that they always correspond to a “local” version.
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1 Introduction
A fundamental question in the theory of portfolio choice with proportional transaction costs is
whether or not there exists a shadow price, i.e., a least favorable frictionless market extension
that leads to the same optimal strategy and utility. If the answer is affirmative, this implies
that the behavior of a given economic agent can be explained by passing to a suitable
frictionless shadow market. Put differently, no qualitatively new effects arise due to the
market frictions. If, on the other hand, a shadow price fails to exist then the impact of
transaction costs cannot be reproduced in any frictionless market.
Answers to this existence question have proved to be rather elusive beyond finite prob-
ability spaces, where shadow prices always exist [15]. In an Itoˆ process setting, Cvitanic´
and Karatzas [4] proved that a shadow price exists and corresponds to the solution of a
suitable dual problem, if the latter is attained in a set of martingales. Yet, existence of a
dual minimizer could later only be guaranteed in a larger set of supermartingales (cf. [5],
also compare [7, 2]), for which the interpretation as a least favorable market extension is not
clear. Loewenstein [18] showed that shadow prices exist in a continuous filtration if short
positions are ruled out, and this condition is in fact sufficient for the existence of shadow
prices for general filtrations (cf. Benedetti et al. [1]). However, a counter-example in the last
study shows that shadow prices may fail to exist without further assumptions. In parallel,
a different counter-example has been put forward by Rokhlin [19]. He shows that shadow
prices generally only exist for a suitable relaxation of the optimization problem at hand,
where the original utility functional is replaced by its lower semicontinuous envelope.
The above counter-examples crucially revolve around either non-standard utility func-
tionals involving Banach limits [19], or unbounded price jumps, unbounded (relative and
absolute) bid-ask spreads, and a candidate shadow price that admits arbitrage [1]. It re-
mained unclear which of these properties are indeed necessary for the non-existence of shadow
prices. Conversely, neither Loewenstein [18] nor Benedetti et al. [1] explain why the presence
of shortselling constraints leads to positive results.
The present study sheds light on both of these questions. We present a counter-example
showing that shadow prices can fail to exist even in seemingly perfectly benign settings, i.e.,
for a log-investor trading in a market with bounded prices and constant bid-ask spread of
arbitrary size. We explain how this happens because transaction costs change the set of
strategies with non-negative terminal positions. That is, shadow prices can fail to exist if
investment choices with transaction costs are strictly more constrained than in any potential
frictionless shadow market. This observation also explains why shortselling constraints rem-
edy the problem: evidently, long-only portfolios always lead to solvent positions both with
and without transaction costs.
In addition, we also clarify the connection between shadow prices and solutions to the
dual problem. Starting with the seminal work of Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [4], it has become
“folklore” that – morally speaking – shadow prices should correspond to the minimizer of the
corresponding dual problem. In the present study, we discuss this in a discrete-time setting
to avoid technicalities and focus on the main ideas. The extension to continuous time leads
to thorny conceptual and substantial technical difficulties, ranging from the ubiquitous issue
of admissibility to delicate questions about path properties of the limits of martingales. It is
therefore deferred to future research. As in [4], we find that if the minimizer among the dual
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supermartingales is in fact a martingale, then it corresponds to a shadow price. Conversely
– under minimal regularity assumptions – the dual minimizers lead to the only potential
shadow prices. In view of the counter-examples in [1, 19] as well as in the present study, the
solution to the dual problem does not, in general, lead to a shadow price in the above “global”
sense. However, it always lies in the superdifferential of the conditional value process, and
hence can be interpreted as a kind of “local” version as follows. Suppose that, at any fixed
trading date, the investor is allowed to carry out a single trade at the local frictionless
shadow price derived from the dual minimizer. Then, even though this provides potentially
more favorable terms of trade, the investor will not deviate from her optimal position in the
financial market with frictions. Across several periods, however, this property breaks down
due to different solvency constraints.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our discrete-
time setting, the utility maximization problem under proportional transaction costs, and
the notion of a shadow price. Section 3 contains a discussion of our counter-example on an
intuitive level; the rigorous mathematical derivations are deferred to Appendix A for better
readability. Section 4 studies the dual minimization problem and its connections to the
(non-)existence of shadow prices; the corresponding proofs are collected in Appendix B.
2 Utility maximization with transaction costs
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a discrete-time financial market with one riskless and one risky asset.1 The
riskless asset can be traded without frictions and its price is assumed to be normalized to
one. Trading the risky asset incurs proportional transaction costs λ ∈ (0, 1). This means
that one has to pay a higher ask price St when buying risky shares but only receives a
lower bid price (1 − λ)St when selling them. Here, S = (St)
T
t=0 denotes a strictly positive,
adapted process defined on a discrete-time filtered probability space
(
Ω,F , (Ft)
T
t=0, P
)
with
fixed finite time horizon T ∈ N. We assume that F0 is trivial and write ∆Xt := Xt −Xt−1,
as well as ϕ • Xt =
∑t
s=1 ϕs∆Xs for the stochastic integral of ϕ with respect to X .
Trading strategies are modeled by R2-valued, predictable processes ϕ = (ϕ0t , ϕ
1
t )
T+1
t=0 ,
where ϕ0t+1 and ϕ
1
t+1 describe the holdings in the riskless and the risky asset, respectively,
after rebalancing the portfolio at time t. A strategy ϕ = (ϕ0t , ϕ
1
t )
T+1
t=0 is called self-financing,
denoted by ϕ ∈ A, if purchases and sales of the risky asset are accounted for in the riskless
position:
∆ϕ0t+1 ≤ −(∆ϕ
1
t+1)
+St + (∆ϕ
1
t+1)
−(1− λ)St, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.1)
We restrict our attention to self-financing strategies starting from a strictly positive initial
cash endowment and liquidating the risky position at the terminal time T , i.e., satisfying
(ϕ00, ϕ
1
0) = (x, 0) as well as ϕ
0
T+1 ≥ 0 and ϕ
1
T+1 = 0. This set is denoted by A(x).
Remark 2.1. Without transaction costs, the above notions reduce to their well-known
frictionless counterparts. Indeed, if bid and ask prices coincide for λ = 0, purchases and
1Several risky assets can be treated along the same lines, but we restrict ourselves to a single one to ease
notation.
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sales do not need to be tracked separately. Instead, one simply works with the number
of risky shares ϕ1t . The corresponding self-financed wealth is then given by the stochastic
integral x+ ϕ1 • St, and the associated riskless position evolves as ϕ
0
t = x+ ϕ
1
• St − ϕ
1
tSt.
See, e.g., [10, Chapter 5.1] for more details. In the present study, our main focus lies on
the interplay between frictional and frictionless markets, cf. Section 2.2. Hence, we restrict
ourselves to the above setting, rather than working with a general cone-valued model as in
[3, 13] because this allows us to formulate all results in direct analogy to the frictionless case.
In the above discrete-time setting, we consider an investor whose preferences are modeled
by a utility function U : (0,∞)→ R in the usual sense.2 She trades to maximize the expected
utility from her terminal cash position:
E[U(g)]→ max! (2.2)
Here, g runs through the set C(x) = {ϕ0T+1 ∈ L
0
+(P ) | ∃(ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(x)} of non-negative
cash positions that can be self-financed with a strategy (ϕ0, ϕ1) starting from the initial
endowment (x, 0).
2.2 Shadow prices
Consider any fictitious risky asset that can be traded without frictions (λ = 0) at a price
S˜ = (S˜t)
T
t=0 taking values in the bid-ask spread [(1 − λ)S, S] of the original market with
transaction costs. Then, since purchases and sales can be carried out at potentially more
favorable prices, any attainable payoff in the market with bid-ask spread [(1 − λ)S, S] can
be dominated by a payoff in the frictionless market with price process S˜. Hence,
u(x) := sup
ϕ0
T+1
∈C(x)
E[U(ϕ0T+1)] ≤ inf
S˜∈[(1−λ)S,S]
sup
ϕ0
T+1
∈C(x;S˜)
E[U(ϕ0T+1)]
=: inf
S˜∈[(1−λ)S,S]
u(x; S˜), (2.3)
where C(x; S˜) denotes the set of non-negative payoffs that can be attained by self-financing
strategies (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(x; S˜) for the frictionless price process S˜. The natural question that
arises here is whether one can find some particularly unfavorable frictionless shadow market
with the same maximal expected utility as the original market with transaction costs. To
achieve this, the corresponding frictionless optimizer has to purchase resp. sell stocks only
when S˜ matches the ask resp. bid price, because trades at strictly more favorable prices
would lead to higher utility. Then, the frictionless optimizer in this “shadow market” is also
available in the original market with transaction costs and hence optimal there as well. This
motivates the following notion:
Definition 2.2. An adapted process Ŝ = (Ŝt)
T
t=0 is called a shadow price if it takes values in
the bid-ask spread [(1−λ)S, S] and there is a solution (ϕ0, ϕ1) to the corresponding frictionless
utility maximization problem
E[U(ϕ0T+1)] = E[U(x+ ϕ
1
• ŜT )]→ max!, (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(x; Ŝ), (2.4)
2That is, a strictly increasing and strictly concave function that is continuously differentiable and satisfies
the Inada conditions U ′(0) := lim
xց0
U ′(x) =∞ and U ′(∞) := lim
xր∞
U ′(x) = 0.
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which trades only at bid-ask prices:
{∆ϕ1t+1 > 0} ⊆ {Ŝt = St} and {∆ϕ
1
t+1 < 0} ⊆ {Ŝt = (1− λ)St}, for t = 0, . . . , T.
Note that a shadow price Ŝ = (Ŝt)
T
t=0 depends on the process S, the investor’s utility
function, and on her initial endowment.
3 A counter-example
In this section, we present an example showing that shadow prices can fail to exist even in
an arbitrage-free two-period market with bounded prices and arbitrarily small transaction
costs. The discussion is kept on an informal level for better readability; the rigorous proofs
are deferred to Appendix A.
The example is a variant of Example 5.1’ in Kramkov and Schachermayer [17]. Consider
an investor with logarithmic utility U(x) = log(x) and an initial endowment of x = 1 riskless
and zero risky assets. The ask price St of the risky asset evolves as illustrated in Figure 1 and
the corresponding bid price is given by (1− λ)St for a constant transaction cost λ ∈ (0, 1).
2
...
1 + 1
n
...
1 + 1
1
3
1+ 1
n+1
1+ 1
1+1
4
1−λ
2
3
1−λ
ε2−n
ε2−1
1− ε
1− ε0
,1
ε0,1
1−
ε1,1
ε1,1
1−
εn,1
εn,1
Figure 1: Illustration of the ask price in the example. The nodes represent the values of the
ask price at time t = 0, 1, 2, connected by the corresponding transition probabilities. The
parameters ε, εi,1 are chosen sufficiently small, cf. Appendix A for more details.
By choosing the constants ε and εn,1, n = 0, 1, . . . in Figure 1 sufficiently small,
3 downward
moves of the risky asset become very unlikely, making it increasingly attractive for the
investor to purchase as many shares of the risky asset as possible. In particular, the investor’s
positions in the risky asset will always be non-negative in this case.
3The formal definition is provided after Theorem A.1.
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On the other hand, the investor’s holdings in the risky asset are limited by the con-
straint that she has to have a positive position after liquidating her portfolio at the terminal
time T to avoid bankruptcy. Since the bid price of the risky asset (at which the investor’s
non-negative risky position has to be liquidated) can go up or down in both periods, the
liquidation value of the investor’s portfolio has to be positive also at time t = 1. Hence,
the investor’s acquisition ∆ϕ11 of risky assets in the first period has to satisfy the following
solvency constraint:
1−∆ϕ11S0 +∆ϕ
1
1(1− λ)S1 ≥ 0,
for all values of S1. Since the latter can go down arbitrarily close to 1, this implies that the
investor’s initial purchase ∆ϕ11 of risky assets is limited by 1/(1 + λ). If the probabilities of
downward movements are chosen small enough, this upper bound becomes binding, i.e., the
investor buys the maximal number ∆ϕ11 = 1/(1 + λ) of risky shares at time 0 that allows
her to avoid bankruptcy.
In the second period, the price of the risky asset can again go up or down. But now,
the solvency constraint at time t = 2 allows the investor to slightly increase her position in
the risky asset in each of the states, which she will do if a suitable choice of the εn,1 makes
downward movements of the latter sufficiently unlikely.
At the terminal time t = 2, the investor just liquidates the positive number of risky assets
she is holding.
In summary, the optimal strategy prescribes purchasing strictly positive amounts of the
risky asset at times t = 0, 1, and liquidating the portfolio with a final sell trade at time
t = 2. Since a shadow price Ŝ must by definition coincide with the trading prices whenever
the optimal strategy transacts, the only candidate for a shadow price Ŝ is given by
Ŝ0 = S0, Ŝ1 = S1, Ŝ2 = (1− λ)S2.
In contrast to the example of [1], this frictionless market is arbitrage-free, and in fact can be
shown to correspond to the minimizer of the dual problem (cf. Appendix A). Nevertheless,
the corresponding optimal strategy for the frictionless market Ŝ does not coincide with the
one in the original market with transaction costs. The reason is that in the frictionless shadow
market the maximal number of shares that can be held in the first period is strictly bigger
than in the original market with transaction costs. Indeed, any initial purchase 0 ≤ ∆ϕ11 ≤ 1
satisfies the frictionless solvency constraint 1 + ∆ϕ11(Ŝ1 − Ŝ0) ≥ 0. Hence, the investor can
invest strictly more into the risky asset than in the original market with transaction costs
(where the upper bound is 1/(1 + λ)), and this is indeed optimal if the probabilities of
downward moves are chosen sufficiently small. Hence, the optimal strategy in the candidate
shadow market Ŝ strictly outperforms its frictional counterpart. Consequently, Ŝ cannot be
a shadow price and – since it was the only candidate – no shadow price exists in the example
at hand.
In fact, the above counter-example shows even more. Fix the above ask price for some
λ ∈ (0, 1). Then, no shadow price exists for all bid-ask spreads λ′ ∈ (0, λ). That is, a shadow
price need not exist even for a fixed ask (or, equivalently, mid) price and arbitrarily small
transaction costs.
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4 Duality
We now discuss the connection between shadow prices and convex duality. To this end, we
first formulate a suitable dual minimization problem (compare [4, 5, 7, 2]) and show that the
abstract versions of the results of Kramkov and Schachermayer [17] allow to extend the key
assertions of the frictionless theory also to the frictional case in a straightforward manner.
Fix a frictionless market S˜ = (S˜t)
T
t=0 and consider the primal utility maximization prob-
lem (2.3). To formulate a corresponding dual minimization problem, consider the conjugate
function V of U , that is, the Legendre transform of −U(−x) given by
V (y) := sup
x>0
{U(x)− xy}, for y > 0.
In a frictionless market with price process S˜, [17] show that a suitable domain of dual
variables is given by
Y(y; S˜) = {Y = (Y )Tt=0 ≥ 0 | Y0 = y and Y (ϕ
0 + ϕ1S˜) =
(
Yt(ϕ
0
t + ϕ
1
t S˜t)
)T
t=0
is a non-negative supermartingale for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1; S˜)}.
In the terminology of [16] , this is the set of supermartingale deflators that turn all admissible
wealth process (in terms of the frictionless price process S˜) into supermartingales. Focusing
on terminal values of the processes in Y(y; S˜), we define the set
D(y; S˜) = {h ∈ L0+(P ) | ∃Y ∈ Y(y; S˜) with h ≤ YT}, for y > 0,
of random variables dominated by a dual element. Then, the dual problem corresponding
to the frictionless utility maximization problem is given by
E[V (YT )]→ min!, Y ∈ Y(y; S˜), (4.1)
or, equivalently,
E[V (h)]→ min!, h ∈ D(y; S˜).
With transaction costs, any frictionless price process S˜ with values in the bid-ask spread
can potentially be used to valuate the risky position in the investor’s portfolio. At first
glance, it is therefore appealing to use as dual variables the set of all such “consistent price
processes” and, for each one, the set of associated supermartingale deflators. Unfortunately,
this set is in general not large enough to contain the dual minimizer. Therefore, one has to
work with the following slightly different notions:
B(y) =
{
(Y 0, Y 1) ≥ 0
∣∣ Y 00 = y, Y 1Y 0 ∈ [(1− λ)S, S] and Y 0(ϕ0 + ϕ1 Y 1Y 0 ) = Y 0ϕ0 + Y 1ϕ1
is a non-negative supermartingale for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1)
}
,
and, accordingly,
D(y) = {h ∈ L0+(P ) | ∃(Y
0, Y 1) ∈ B(y) with h ≤ Y 0T } for y > 0.
In the above definition of B(y), the investor’s risky position ϕ1 is valued at the frictionless
price process Y 1/Y 0. However, multiplication with the supermartingale Y 0 only needs to
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turn those frictionless wealth processes ϕ0+ϕ1Y 1/Y 0 into supermartingales that are gener-
ated by a strategy (ϕ0, ϕ1) which is admissible in the original market with transaction costs.
Since this is a (potentially strict) subset of the set of admissible strategies in the frictionless
market with price process Y 1/Y 0, the process Y 0 need not be an admissible dual variable
for the frictionless market with price process Y 1/Y 0. This subtle distinction disappears if
the dual variable (Y 0, Y 1) is a martingale (cf. the proof of Lemma 4.5), but plays a crucial
role in the examples where shadow prices do not exist (compare Appendix A). This is why
we use the above definitions of B(y) and D(y).
Remark 4.1. Let us compare these definitions with the notion of consistent price sys-
tems [20] for transaction costs λ (henceforth CPSλ) ubiquitous in the theory of no-arbitrage
with transaction costs (cf., e.g., [11, 14, 12, 20] as well as the monograph of Kabanov and
Safarian [13] and the references therein). The set Z of λ-consistent price systems consists of
those martingales (Z0, Z1) ≥ 0 such that the ratio Z1/Z0 evolves within the bid-ask spread
[(1 − λ)S, S]. Since its first component is the density process of an equivalent martingale
measure for the frictionless risky asset S˜ := Z1/Z0, existence of a CPSλ rules out arbitrage
also in the original market S with transaction costs λ, since the terms of trade are never more
favorable in the latter. The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing with Transaction Costs
then states that the converse also holds true true (see, e.g., [14, 20]); in this sense, CPSλ play
a role analogous to martingale measures in the frictionless case. One readily verifies that
the set Z of λ-consistent price systems is contained in B(y) if the initial value of the first
component is rescaled by y. Hence, the set B(y) of dual variables is an extension of the set
of CPSλ, just as martingale measures are contained in the set of supermartingale deflators
used in the frictionless case. Indeed, the set of dual variables is precisely the Fatou-closure
of the smaller sets in both cases.4 More specifically, the proof of Lemma B.1 below shows
that the set B(y) of supermartingale densities in the definition of the dual variables D(y)
can be replaced by almost sure limits of CPSλ: let
B˜(y) =
{
Y = (Y 0t , Y
1
t )
T
t=0
∣∣∣ ∃(Z0,n, Z1,n) ∈ Z such that
Y 0t = lim
n→∞
yZ0,nt and Y
1
t = lim
n→∞
yZ1,nt for each t = 0, . . . , T
}
.
Then, D(y) = {h ∈ L0+(P ) | ∃(Y
0, Y 1) ∈ B˜(y) with h ≤ Y 0T } for y > 0.
Using the dual variables proposed above, we have the following duality results in direct
analogy to the frictionless case [17, Theorems 2.1 and 2.2]. For better readability, the proof
is deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that S satisfies (CPSλ
′
) for some λ′ ∈ [0, λ),5 the asymptotic elas-
ticity of U is strictly less than one, i.e., AE(U) := lim sup
x→∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
< 1, and the maximal
expected utility is finite, u(x) := supg∈C(x)E[U(g)] <∞, for some x ∈ (0,∞). Then:
4Compare the discussion in [21, p. 47] for the frictionless case.
5This is equivalent to the “robust no-arbitrage property” of Schachermayer [20], i.e., absence of arbitrage
even for slightly smaller trading costs.
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1) The primal value function u and the dual value function
v(y) := inf
h∈D(y)
E[V (h)]
are conjugate, i.e.,
u(x) = inf
y>0
{v(y) + xy}, v(y) = sup
x>0
{u(x)− xy},
and continuously differentiable on (0,∞). The functions u and −v are strictly concave,
strictly increasing, and satisfy the Inada conditions
lim
x→0
u′(x) =∞, lim
y→∞
v′(y) = 0, lim
x→∞
u′(x) = 0, lim
y→0
v′(y) = −∞.
2) For all x, y > 0, the solutions ĝ(x) ∈ C(x) and ĥ(y) ∈ D(y) to the primal problem
E [U(g)]→ max!, g ∈ C(x),
and the dual problem
E [V (h)]→ min!, h ∈ D(y), (4.2)
exist, are unique, and there are
(
ϕ̂0(x), ϕ̂1(x)
)
∈ A(x) and
(
Ŷ 0(y), Ŷ 1(y)
)
∈ B(y) such
that
ϕ̂0T+1(x) = ĝ(x) and Ŷ
0
T (y) = ĥ(y). (4.3)
3) For all x > 0, let ŷ(x) = u′(x) > 0 which is the unique solution to
v(y) + xy → min!, y > 0.
Then, ĝ(x) and ĥ
(
ŷ(x)
)
are given by (U ′)−1
(
ĥ
(
ŷ(x)
))
and U ′
(
ĝ(x)
)
, respectively, and
we have that E
[
ĝ(x)ĥ
(
ŷ(x)
)]
= xŷ(x). In particular, the process
Ŷ 0
(
ŷ(x)
)
ϕ̂0(x) + Ŷ 1
(
ŷ(x)
)
ϕ̂1(x) =
(
Ŷ 0t
(
ŷ(x)
)
ϕ̂0t (x) + Ŷ
1
t
(
ŷ(x)
)
ϕ̂1t (x)
)T
t=0
is a martingale for all
(
ϕ̂0(x), ϕ̂1(x)
)
∈ A(x) and
(
Ŷ 0
(
ŷ(x)
)
, Ŷ 1
(
ŷ(x)
))
∈ B
(
ŷ(x)
)
satisfying (4.3) with y = ŷ(x).
4) Moreover,
Ŷ 0
(
ŷ(x)
)
ϕ̂0(x) + Ŷ 1
(
ŷ(x)
)
ϕ̂1(x) = Ŷ 0
(
ŷ(x)
) (
x+ ϕ̂1(x) • Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
,
which implies that {∆ϕ̂1t+1 > 0} ⊆
{
Ŷ 1t
Ŷ 0t
= St
}
and {∆ϕ̂1t+1 < 0} ⊆
{
Ŷ 1t
Ŷ 0t
= (1− λ)St
}
for t = 0, . . . , T .
5) Finally, we have v(y) = inf
(Z0,Z1)∈Z
E[V (yZ0T )].
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Remark 4.3. Note that while the terminal values ϕ̂0T+1(x) and Ŷ
0
T (y) are unique, this is
not necessarily true for the processes
(
ϕ̂0(x), ϕ̂1(x)
)
and
(
Ŷ 0(y), Ŷ 1(y)
)
. For the optimal
strategies, this is in analogy to the frictionless case, where uniqueness also only holds for
the optimal terminal payoff. For the dual minimizer, uniqueness is guaranteed for the first
component Yˆ 0 by strict concavity of the dual objective function like in the frictionless case.
However, the second component need not be unique. E.g., if the mid-price S is a martingale,
any martingale evolving in the bid-spread (e.g., any suitable multiple of the mid price) will
lead to a dual minimizer after multiplying with Yˆ 0.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2, we have the following two results clarifying the
connection between dual minimizers and shadow prices. The proofs are again postponed to
Appendix B. The first result shows that the following insight of Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [4]
is also true in the present context: if there is no “loss of mass” in the dual problem with
transaction costs, then its minimizer corresponds to a shadow price:
Proposition 4.4. If there is a minimizer (Ŷ 0, Ŷ 1) ∈ B
(
ŷ(x)
)
of the dual problem (4.1)
which is a martingale,6 then Ŝ := Ŷ 1/Ŷ 0 is a shadow price.
Conversely, the following result shows that if a shadow price exists, it is necessarily
derived from a dual minimizer.
Proposition 4.5. If a shadow price Ŝ exists, it is given by Ŝ = Ŷ 1/Ŷ 0 for a minimizer
(Ŷ 0, Ŷ 1) ∈ B
(
ŷ(x)
)
of the dual problem (4.1).
In view of the counter-example presented in Section 3, the dual minimizer from Theorem
4.2 does not necessarily give rise to a frictionless shadow market in the global sense of
Definition 2.2. Locally for each period (t, t + 1), however, it can always be interpreted in
such a manner. To make this idea precise, we consider the two-dimensional optimization
problem corresponding to (2.2), given by
E[U(ϕ0T+1, ϕ
1
T+1)]→ max!, (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(x), (4.4)
with the two-dimensional objective function
U(x, y) :=
{
U(x) : y ≥ 0 and x > 0,
−∞ : else.
For every t = 0, . . . , T and every (ψ0, ψ1) ∈ L0(Ω,Ft, P ;R
2), we define the Ft-conditional
value function:7
6Note that, since we are working in finite discrete time, every non-negative local martingale is actually a
true martingale.
7Here, we use a generalized conditional expectation: setting +∞−∞ = −∞, we define
E
[
U
(
ψ0 + (ϕ˜0
T+1 − ϕ˜
0
t
), ψ1 + (ϕ˜1
T+1 − ϕ˜
1
t
)
)∣∣Ft] :=E[(U(ψ0 + (ϕ˜0T+1 − ϕ˜0t ), ψ1 + (ϕ˜1T+1 − ϕ˜1t )))+∣∣Ft]
− E
[(
U
(
ψ0 + (ϕ˜0
T+1 − ϕ˜
0
t
), ψ1 + (ϕ˜1
T+1 − ϕ˜
1
t
)
))−∣∣Ft].
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Ut(ψ
0, ψ1) := ess sup
(ϕ˜0,ϕ˜1)∈A
E
[
U
(
ψ0 + (ϕ˜0T+1 − ϕ˜
0
t ), ψ
1 + (ϕ˜1T+1 − ϕ˜
1
t )
)∣∣Ft].
All dual minimizers then lie in the Ft-conditional superdifferential along the optimal strategy
(ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) of this Ft-conditional concave function in the following sense:
Proposition 4.6. For any dual minimizer (Ŷ 0, Ŷ 1) ∈ B
(
ŷ(x)
)
, we have that
Ut(ψ
0, ψ1) ≤ Ut(ϕ̂
0
t , ϕ̂
1
t ) + (ψ
0 − ϕ̂0t )Ŷ
0
t + (ψ
1 − ϕ̂1t )Ŷ
1
t (4.5)
a.s. for all (ψ0, ψ1) ∈ L0(Ω,Ft, P ;R
2) and all t = 0, . . . , T .
This result can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that up to time t− 1, the investor has
followed the strategy ϕ̂. At time t she is allowed to make an additional trade in terms of the
frictionless price Ŷ 1t /Ŷ
0
t corresponding to the dual minimizer. If she trades a number ν of
shares, her risky position then moves to ψ1t := ϕ̂
1
t + ν, whereas her cash balance changes to
ψ0t := ϕ̂
0
t−νŶ
1
t /Ŷ
0
t . Inequality (4.5) implies that none of these trades increases the investor’s
indirect utility:
Ut(ψ
0
t , ψ
1
t ) ≤ Ut(ϕ̂
0
t , ϕ̂
1
t ).
Consequently, allowing the investor to trade in terms of the potentially more favorable fric-
tionless price Ŷ 1t /Ŷ
0
t at a single trading time t does not cause her to deviate from the
frictional optimal policy. Note, however, that in contrast to Definition 2.2 this interpreta-
tion is only “local”: the value functions on both sides of the above inequality still refer to
the transaction cost problem in all other periods. In the counter-example from Section 3, for
example, increasing the risky investment in the first period beyond the value of the frictional
optimizer would still lead to bankruptcy when liquidating at bid-ask prices later on, unlike
when considering – simulataneously in all periods – the “global” frictionless market Ŷ 1/Ŷ 0
derived from the dual minimizer.
A Rigorous analysis of the counter-example
This section contains a precise mathematical analysis of the counter-example discussed on
an informal level in Section 3. To this end, we first compute the optimal policy in the
original market with transaction costs by discrete-time dynamic programming, i.e., backward
induction, and explicit calculations. This in turn determines a unique candidate shadow
price, for which backward induction again leads to the optimal policy. The latter, however,
does not coincide with the original one, and leads to higher utility. In summary, this shows:
Theorem A.1. Fix λ ∈ (0, 1). There exists an arbitrage-free bounded process S = (St)
2
t=0
based on a countable probability space Ω = {ωn,1, ωn,2}
∞
n=0 with the following properties:
1) For the log-utility maximization problem with initial endowment (ϕ00, ϕ
1
0) = (1, 0) and
under transaction costs λ ∈ (0, 1), the solution (ϕ̂0t , ϕ̂
1
t )
3
t=0 to the primal problem
E[U(ϕ03)] = E[log(ϕ
0
3)]→ max!, (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1), (A.1)
11
and the solution (Ŷ 0t , Ŷ
1
t )
2
t=0 to the dual problem
E[V (Y 02 )] = E[− log(Y
0
2 )− 1]→ min!, (Y
0, Y 1) ∈ B(1), (A.2)
for ŷ(x) = 1 exist and are unique.
2) The unique candidate (Ŝt)
2
t=0 := (Ŷ
1
t /Ŷ
0
t )
2
t=0 for a frictionless shadow price process Ŝ
is arbitrage-free, and takes values in the bid-ask spread [(1− λ)S, S].
3) Despite 1) and 2), the frictionless log-utility optimization problem
E[log(ϕ03)] = E[log(1 + ϕ
1
• Ŝ2)]→ max!, (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1; Ŝ), (A.3)
for Ŝ yields a different solution and a higher value than its counterpart for S under
transaction costs λ.
The remainder of Appendix A is devoted to proving Theorem A.1 by means of the
explicit counter-example discussed on an informal level in Section 3. To make the latter –
illustrated in Figure 1 – precise, define the transition probabilities P [{ω0,1, ω0,2}] = (1− ε),
P [{ω0,1}] = (1 − ε)p0,1, P [{ωn,1, ωn,2}] = ε2
−n =: pn and P [{ωn,1}] = pn(1 − εn,1), for
sufficiently small ε, εi,1. More specifically, we take ε ∈ (0,
1
3
) and
p0,1 := (1− ε0,1) =
(1 + 2λ)(3 + q0 + λ+ q0λ)
2(1 + λ)(2 + λ)
,
pn,1 := (1− εn,1) =
(1 + n(2 + n)λ) ((2n− 1)q1(1 + λ) + n
2(2 + λ))
n2(1 + nλ)(1 + 2λ+ n(2 + λ))
with q0 ∈ (0,
1−λ
1+3λ+2λ2
) and q1 ∈ (0,
1−λ
1+4λ+3λ2
). To determine the optimal strategy in this
example, apply discrete-time dynamic programming (cf., e.g., [8] and the references therein)
to the two-dimensional optimization problem corresponding to (A.1):
E[U(ϕ03, ϕ
1
3)]→ max!, (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1),
with the two-dimensional objective function
U(x, y) :=
{
log(x) : y ≥ 0 and x > 0,
−∞ : else.
The corresponding value function is then given by
Ut(x, y) = ess sup
(ϕ˜0,ϕ˜1)∈A
E
[
U
(
x+ (ϕ˜03 − ϕ˜
0
t ), y + (ϕ˜
1
3 − ϕ˜
1
t )
)∣∣Ft],
for (x, y) ∈ R2 and t = 0, 1, 2. Here we define Ut(x, y) = −∞, if there exists no (ϕ˜
0, ϕ˜1) ∈ A
such that
(
x + (ϕ˜03 − ϕ˜
0
t ), y + (ϕ˜
1
3 − ϕ˜
1
t )
)
∈ dom(U). Since the bid and ask prices can
go up or down in any period, this happens precisely if the liquidation value ℓt(x, y) :=
x+ y+(1− λ)St − y
−St of the position (x, y) at time t is nonpositive.
By the definition of Ut and the structure ofA, we have the dynamic programming property
Ut(x, y) = ess sup
ℓt(−∆ϕ˜0t+1,−∆ϕ˜
1
t+1)≥0
E[Ut+1
(
x+∆ϕ˜0t+1, y +∆ϕ˜
1
t+1)|Ft], (A.4)
which allows us to compute the solution (ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) to (A.1) by optimizing in (A.4) recursively.
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Remark A.2. ℓt(−∆ϕ˜
0
t+1,−∆ϕ˜
1
t+1) ≥ 0 in (A.4) means that the trade at time t needs to be
self-financing. The second requirement of admissibility, namely a strictly positive liquidation
wealth, is ensured automatically for the optimizer in (A.4) by definition of U .
Lemma A.3. The solution (ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) to problem (A.1) is given by (ϕ̂00, ϕ̂
1
0) = (1, 0),
∆ϕ̂11 =
1
1 + λ
, ∆ϕ̂12(ω0,i) = q0, ∆ϕ̂
1
2(ωn,i) =
q1
n
, for i = 1, 2 and n ∈ N, ∆ϕ̂13 = −ϕ̂
1
2,
where the cash position ϕ̂0 is determined by the self-financing condition (2.1) (with equality).
The superdifferential ∂U(ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) of the value function along the optimal strategy (ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) is
given by
∂U0(ϕ̂
0
0, ϕ̂
1
0) =
{
(1,S0)
ϕ̂0
0
+ϕ̂1
0
S0
}
, ∂U1(ϕ̂
0
1, ϕ̂
1
1) =
{
(1,S1)
ϕ̂0
1
+ϕ̂1
1
S1
}
, ∂U2(ϕ̂
0
2, ϕ̂
1
2) =
{
(1,(1−λ)S2)
ϕ̂0
2
+ϕ̂1
2
(1−λ)S2
}
.
Proof. Since the investor’s portfolio is liquidated at the terminal time T = 3,
U2(ϕ
0
2, ϕ
1
2) = log
(
ϕ02 + (ϕ
1
2)
+(1− λ)S2 − (ϕ
1
2)
−S2
)
(A.5)
for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1). At time t = 1, we have
E[U2(ϕ
0
1 +∆ϕ˜
0
2, ϕ
1
1 +∆ϕ˜
1
2)|F1](ωn,i) = fn(∆ϕ˜
1
2;ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1)
for ∆ϕ˜12 ≥ 0 and ϕ
1
1 +∆ϕ˜
1
2 ≥ 0, where
fn(∆ϕ˜
1
2;ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1) := E
[
log
(
ϕ01 + ϕ
1
1S1 + (ϕ
1
1 +∆ϕ˜
1
2)
(
(1− λ)S2 − S1
))∣∣∣F1](ωn,i)
for i = 1, 2 and n ∈ N0. Therefore the maximizer as well as the optimal value in (A.4) agree
with their counterparts for
fn
(
∆ϕ˜12(ωn,i);ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1
)
→ max!, ∆ϕ˜12(ωn,i) ∈ R, (A.6)
for i = 1, 2 and n ∈ N0 as long as the maximizer of (A.4) falls into the domain where
both functions coincide. (Note that local maxima are global maxima by concavity.) Since
fn(∆ϕ˜
1
2(ωn,i);ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1) is differentiable with respect to ∆ϕ˜
1
2(ωn,i), the maximizer to (A.6) is
determined by the first order condition f ′n
(
∆ϕ˜12(ωn,i);ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1
)
= 0. Solving the latter equation,
we obtain that
∆ϕ̂12(ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1, 0) :=
(
ϕ01 + ϕ
1
1S1(ω0,i)
)1 + λ
λ+ 2
(
1
1 + λ
+ q0
)
− ϕ11 (A.7)
and
∆ϕ̂12(ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1, n) :=
(
ϕ01 + ϕ
1
1S1(ωn,i)
) 1 + λ
λ+ 1
n
(
1
1 + λ
+
q1
n
)
− ϕ11, n ∈ N, (A.8)
maximize (A.6) due to our choice of pn,1.
Since (
ϕ01 + ϕ
1
1S1(ω0,i)
)
≥
(
ϕ01 + ϕ
1
1S1(ωn,i)
)
≥
λ+ 1
n
1 + λ
13
for all i = 1, 2, n ∈ N0, and (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1) with ϕ11 > 0 because S1(ω0,i) ≥ S1(ωn,i)
and ϕ˜11 ∈
(
− 1
1+λ
, 1
1+λ
]
for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1), we obtain that ∆ϕ̂12(ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1, n) ≥ 0 and
ϕ11 + ∆ϕ̂
1
2(ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1, n) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N0 and (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1) with ϕ11 > 0. Therefore
∆ϕ̂12(ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1, n) ≥ 0 and ϕ
1
1 + ∆ϕ̂
1
2(ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1, n) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N0 for all (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1), as
this is clearly also true for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1) with ϕ11 ≤ 0. Plugging ∆ϕ̂
1
2(ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1) into (A.4)
gives
U1(ϕ
0
1, ϕ
1
1) = log(ϕ
0
1 + ϕ
1
1S1) + C1 (A.9)
for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1), where
C1 =
{
E
[
log
(
1 + 1+λ
λ+2
(
1
1+λ
+ q0
))
((1− λ)S2 − S1)|F1
]
(ω0,·),
E
[
log
(
1 + 1+λ
λ+1/n
(
1
1+λ
+ q1
n
))
((1− λ)S2 − S1)|F1
]
(ωn,·).
At time t = 0, we observe similarly as at time t = 1 that
E[U1(ϕ
0
0 +∆ϕ˜
0
1, ϕ
1
0 +∆ϕ˜
1
1)] = h(∆ϕ˜
1
1;ϕ
0
0, ϕ
1
0)
for ∆ϕ˜11 ≥ 0 and ϕ
1
0 +∆ϕ˜
1
1 ≥ 0, where
h(∆ϕ˜11;ϕ
0
0, ϕ
1
0) := E[log(ϕ
0
0 + ϕ
1
0S0 + (ϕ
1
0 +∆ϕ˜
1
1)(S1 − S0)) + C1].
Then as before the maximizer as well as the optimal value in (A.4) agree with their coun-
terparts for
h(∆ϕ˜11;ϕ
0
0, ϕ
1
0)→ max!, ∆ϕ˜
1
1 ∈
(
−
1
1 + λ
,
1
1 + λ
]
, (A.10)
as long as the maximizer of (A.10) falls into the domain where both functions coincide. The
function h is differentiable with respect to ∆ϕ˜11 and its derivative is
h′(∆ϕ˜11;ϕ
0
0, ϕ
1
0) = (1− ε)
1
ϕ00 + ϕ
1
02 + ∆ϕ˜
1
1
+ ε
∞∑
n=1
2−n
1
n
− 1
ϕ00 + ϕ
1
02 + ∆ϕ˜
1
1(
1
n
− 1)
.
For ϕ00 = 1, ϕ
1
0 = 0 and ∆ϕ˜
1
1 =
1
1+λ
we obtain that
h′
( 1
1 + λ
; 1, 0
)
= (1− ε)
2
1 + 1
1+λ
+ ε
∞∑
n=1
2−n
1
n
− 1
1 + 1
1+λ
( 1
n
− 1)
≥ (1 + λ)
(
(1− ε)
1
2
+ ε
∞∑
n=1
2−n(1− n)
)
= (1 + λ)
(
(1− ε)
1
2
+ ε
(
1−
1
2
(1
2
− 1)2
))
= (1 + λ)
(
1
2
− ε
3
2
)
> 0
for ε ∈ (0, 1
3
), which implies that the concave function h( · ; 1, 0) attains its maximum over
∆ϕ˜11 ∈ (−
1
1+λ
, 1
1+λ
] at ∆ϕ˜11 =
1
1+λ
. Insertion into (A.4) gives
U0(ϕ
0
0, ϕ
1
0) = log(ϕ
0
0 + ϕ
1
0S0) + c0 (A.11)
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with c0 = E
[
log
(
1 + 1
1+λ
(S1 − S0)
)
+ C1
]
for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1).
To verify the optimality of the strategy defined in the assertion, we observe that
E[U(ϕ̂03, ϕ̂
1
3)] = U0(1, 0) = sup
(ϕ0,ϕ1)∈A(1)
E[U(ϕ03, ϕ
1
3)]
by the above considerations, which already implies that (ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) is the solution to (A.4).
As ϕ̂12 > 0, (A.5) yields that ∂U2(ϕ̂
0
2, ϕ̂
1
2) =
{
(1,(1−λ)S2)
ϕ̂0
2
+ϕ̂1
2
(1−λ)S2
}
. To compute ∂U1(ϕ̂
0
1, ϕ̂
1
1), we
observe that (A.7) and (A.8) are continuous with respect to (ϕ0, ϕ1) and that ∆ϕ̂12(ϕ̂
0
1, ϕ̂
1
1, n) >
0 and ϕ̂11 + ∆ϕ̂
1
2(ϕ̂
0
1, ϕ̂
1
1, n) > 0 for all n ∈ N0. Therefore (A.9) is also valid in some suffi-
ciently small open neighborhood of (ϕ̂01, ϕ̂
1
1) and we obtain that ∂U1(ϕ̂
0
1, ϕ̂
1
1) =
{
(1,S1)
ϕ̂0
1
+ϕ̂1
1
S1
}
by differentiating (A.9). For ϕ = (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A such that (ϕ00, ϕ
1
0) lies in some sufficiently
small open neighborhood of (ϕ̂00, ϕ̂
1
0) = (1, 0), we have that ϕ is solvent at time t = 1 if
∆ϕ11 ∈
(
−
ϕ0
0
+ϕ1
0
S0
1+λ
,
ϕ0
0
+ϕ1
0
S0
1+λ
]
, and therefore that (A.11) also holds in this case. Differentiat-
ing (A.11) then implies ∂U0(ϕ̂
0
0, ϕ̂
1
0) =
{
(1,S0)
ϕ̂0
0
+ϕ̂1
0
S0
}
, completing the proof.
Lemma A.4. The solution (Ŷ 0, Ŷ 1) ∈ B(1) to the dual problem (A.2) is given by
(Ŷ 00 , Ŷ
1
0 ) =
(1, S0)
ϕ̂00 + ϕ̂
1
0S0
, (Ŷ 01 , Ŷ
1
1 ) =
(1, S1)
ϕ̂01 + ϕ̂
1
1S1
, (Ŷ 02 , Ŷ
1
2 ) =
(1, (1− λ)S2)
ϕ̂02 + ϕ̂
1
2(1− λ)S2
. (A.12)
Both Ŷ 0 and Ŷ 1 are strict supermartingales, i.e., fail to be true martingales. Nevertheless,
(Ŝt)
2
t=0 := (Ŷ
1
t /Ŷ
0
t )
2
t=0 evolves in the bid-ask spread and the corresponding frictionless market
is arbitrage-free.
Proof. By Proposition 4.6 the solution to the dual problem is always valued in the Ft-
conditional superdifferential of the Ft-conditional value function along the optimal strategy
(ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1). As this Ft-conditional superdifferential coincides in the present Markovian set-up
with the superdifferential of the value function, which is by Lemma A.3 single-valued, the
process (Ŷ 0, Ŷ 1) given in (A.12) is the unique solution to the dual problem (A.2).
To see that Ŷ 0 and Ŷ 1 are only supermartingales but no martingales, we note that
E[Ŷ 01 (S1 − S0)|F0] = h
′( 1
1+λ
; 1, 0) ∈
(
0, 1+λ
2
)
and hence
E
[
Ŷ 01
Ŷ 00
∣∣∣∣F0] = 1− ϕ̂10E[Ŷ 01 (S1 − S0)|F0] < 1,
which also implies that
E[Ŷ 11 − Ŷ
1
0 |F0] = E[Ŷ
0
1 (S1 − S0) + (Ŷ
0
1 − Ŷ
0
0 )S0|F0] = E[Ŷ
0
1 (S1 − S0)|F0](1− ϕ̂
1
0S0Ŷ
0
0 ) < 0.
Since (Ŝt)
2
t=0 = (Ŷ
1
t /Ŷ
0
t )
2
t=0 can go up and down with a positive probability in each period,
Ŝ is an arbitrage-free price process. As Ŝ takes values in the bid-ask spread [(1− λ)S, S] by
definition, this completes the proof.
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The solution to the frictionless log-utility maximization problem for the price process
(Ŝt)
2
t=0 := (Ŷ
1
t /Ŷ
0
t )
2
t=0 can again be computed recursively. The corresponding maximal
expected utility turns out to be strictly higher than in the original market with transaction
costs; hence Ŝ cannot be a shadow price for the latter. Since it is the only candidate, this
shows that a shadow price does not exist.
Lemma A.5. The solution (ψ̂0, ψ̂1) to the frictionless log-utility maximization problem (A.3)
with risky asset Ŝ is given by (ψ̂00, ψ̂
1
0) = (1, 0),
∆ψ̂11 = 1, ∆ψ̂
1
2(ω0,i) = 2
1 + λ
2 + λ
(
1
1 + λ
+ q0
)
−1, ∆ψ̂12(ωn,i) =
1
n
1 + λ
λ+ 1
n
(
1
1 + λ
+
q1
n
)
−1,
and ∆ψ̂13 = −ψ̂
1
2 for i = 1, 2 and n ∈ N, where the cash positions ψ̂
0
t , t = 1, 2, 3 are
determined by the self-financing condition (2.1) (with equality). The maximal expected utility
in this frictionless market is strictly higher than in the original market with transaction costs,
sup
(ϕ0,ϕ1)∈A(1;Ŝ)
E[log(ϕ03)] > sup
(ϕ0,ϕ1)∈A(1)
E[log(ϕ03)].
Moreover, the frictionless dual minimizer Ŷ = 1/(ψ̂0 + ψ̂1Ŝ) does not coincide with its
frictional counterpart.
Proof. The solution to the frictionless primal problem can be calculated recursively by dy-
namic programming as in Lemma A.3. At time t = 1, one has to solve
E
[
log(1 + ϕ11∆Ŝ1 + ϕ
1
2∆Ŝ2)
∣∣F1](ωn,i) = fn(ϕ12; 1 + ϕ11∆Ŝ1, 0)→ max!, ϕ12 ∈ R,
which, by (A.8), has the solution ψ̂12(ω0,i) = (1 + ϕ
1
1∆Ŝ1)
1+λ
λ+2
(
1
1+λ
+ q0
)
and ψ̂12(ωn,i) =
(1 + ϕ11∆Ŝ1)
1+λ
λ+ 1
n
(
1
1+λ
+ q1
n
)
for i = 1, 2 and n ∈ N. At time t = 0, the frictionless Ŝ-agent
can buy more stocks than the agent with transaction costs and therefore has the different
admissibility constraint ϕ11 ∈ (−1, 1]. Hence, her optimal strategy is determined by solving
the problem
E[log(1 + ϕ11∆Ŝ1) + C1] = h(ϕ
1
1; 1, 0)→ max!, ϕ
1
1 ∈ (−1, 1].
Similarly as in the proof of Lemma A.3 we have h′(1; 1, 0) = (1
2
− ε3
2
) > 0. Therefore the
concave function h( · ; 1, 0) attains its maximum over (−1, 1] at ψ̂1 = 1 and
sup
(ϕ0,ϕ1)∈A(Ŝ)
E[log(1 + ϕ1 • Ŝ2)] = h(ψ̂1; 1, 0) > h(∆ϕ̂
1
0; 1, 0) = sup
(ϕ0,ϕ1)∈A(1)
E[U(ϕ03, ϕ
1
3)].
Since E[log(1 + ψ̂1 • Ŝ2)] = sup(ϕ0,ϕ1)∈A(Ŝ)E[log(1 + ϕ
1
• Ŝ2)], (1 + ψ̂
1
• Ŝ1)(ω0,i) = 2 and
(1 + ψ̂1 • Ŝ1)(ωn,i) =
1
n
for i = 1, 2 and n ∈ N, the solution to (A.3) is given by (ψ̂0, ψ1) as
above. The frictionless dual minimizer is then given by Ŷ = 1
1+ψ̂1•S
, since Ŷ2 =
1
1+ψ̂1•S2
and
(1 + ψ̂1 • S)Ŷ is a martingale by [17, Theorem 2.2]. This completes the proof.
A similar but even more tedious analysis of this example shows that a shadow price need
not exist even if one fixes the ask price S for some λ ∈ (0, 1), but considers all arbitrary
small spreads λ′ ∈ (0, λ).
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B Proofs for Section 4
The proof of parts 1)–3) of Theorem 4.2 follow from the abstract versions of the main results
in [17, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2] once we have shown in the lemma below that the relations
in [17, Proposition 3.1] hold true. We call a set G ⊆ L0+(P ) solid, if 0 ≤ f ≤ g and g ∈ G
imply that f ∈ G, and use that C(x) = xC(1) =: xC and D(y) = yD(1) =: yD. For part 5) of
Theorem 4.2 we show in assertion 4) below that D := {Z0T | (Z
0, Z1) ∈ Z} is closed under
countable convex combinations. Its proof then follows from [17, Proposition 3.2].
Lemma B.1. Suppose that S satisfies (CPSλ
′
) for some λ′ ∈ (0, λ). Then:
1) C and D are convex, solid and closed in the topology of convergence in measure.
2) g ∈ C iff E[gh] ≤ 1, for all h ∈ D, and h ∈ D iff E[gh] ≤ 1, for all g ∈ C.
3) C is a bounded subset of L0+(P ) and contains the constant function 1.
4) D := {Z0T | (Z
0, Z1) ∈ Z} is closed under countable convex combinations.
Proof. 1) The sets C and D are convex and solid by definition. The assumption that S
satisfies (CPSλ
′
) for some λ′ ∈ (0, λ) implies the existence of a strictly consistent price
system (see Definition 1.5 in [20]). Therefore ÂT := {(ϕ
0
T , ϕ
1
T ) | (ϕ
0, ϕ1) ∈ A} and hence
C =
(
(1, 0) + ÂT
)
∩ L0+(P )× {0} are closed with respect to convergence in measure by The-
orems 1.7 and 2.1 in [20], where we identify L0(Ω,F , P ;R× {0}) with L0(Ω,F , P ;R). The
closedness of D follows by similar arguments as in Lemma 4.1 in [17]. Indeed, let (hn) be a
sequence in D converging to some h in measure. Then there exists a sequence
(
(Y 0,n, Y 1,n)
)
in B(1) such that Y 0,nT ≥ h
n for each n ∈ N. Since Y 0,n and Y 1,n are non-negative super-
martingales, there exist by (the arguments in the proof of) Lemma 5.2.1 in [9] a sequence
(Y˜ n,0, Y˜ n,1) ∈ conv
(
(Y 0,n, Y 1,n), (Y 0,n+1, Y 1,n+1), . . .
)
for n ≥ 1 and supermartingales Y˜ 0 and
Y˜ 1 such that (Y˜ n,0t ) is almost surely convergent to Y˜
0
t and (Y˜
n,1
t ) to Y˜
1
t for each t = 0, . . . , T .
This almost sure convergence is then sufficient to deduce that (Y˜ 0, Y˜ 1) is R2+-valued with
Y˜ 00 = 1, and that Y˜
0ϕ0+ Y˜ 1ϕ1 is a non-negative supermartingale for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(1) and
Y˜ 0T ≥ h, which implies that (Y˜
0, Y˜ 1) ∈ B(1) and hence that h ∈ D.
2) Since D ⊆ D, we obtain the first assertion by the superreplication theorem under
transaction costs [20, Theorem 4.1]. The second assertion then follows by the same arguments
as the proof of Proposition 3.1 in [17].
3) The fact that C contains the constant function 1 follows by definition; the L0+(P )-
boundedness is implied by the existence of a strictly positive element in D.
4) By martingale convergence, D is closed in the norm of L1(P ) and hence under countable
convex combinations.
Proof of part 4) of Theorem 4.2. By the proof of part 1) of Lemma B.1 above and part 5)
of Theorem 4.2 there exists a sequence
(
(Z0,n, Z1,n)
)
in Z such that ŷ(x)Z0,nt and ŷ(x)Z
1,n
t
converge almost surely to Ŷ 0t
(
ŷ(x)
)
and Ŷ 1t
(
ŷ(x)
)
for each t = 0, . . . , T . As Z
1,n
Z0,n
is valued in
the bid-ask spread [(1 − λ)S, S], any (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(x) is also self-financing for Z
1,n
Z0,n
without
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frictions (λ = 0) and Z0,n
(
x + ϕ1 • Z
1,n
Z0,n
)
is a local martingale that is bounded from below
and hence a supermartingale. Therefore we obtain that
E[Z0,nT ϕ̂
0
T+1(x)] = E
[
Z0,nT
(∑T+1
k=1
(
∆ϕ̂0k(x) +
Z1,n
k−1
Z0,n
k−1
∆ϕ̂1k(x)
)
+ x+ ϕ̂1(x) • Z
1,n
Z0,n T
)]
≤ E
[
Z0,nT
(∑T+1
k=1
(
∆ϕ̂0k(x) +
Z1,n
k−1
Z0,n
k−1
∆ϕ̂1k(x)
))]
+ x.
Applying Fatou’s Lemma twice the latter implies that
xŷ(x) = E
[
Ŷ 0T
(
ŷ(x)
)
ϕ̂0T+1(x)
]
≤ lim inf
n→∞
E[ŷ(x)Z0,nT ϕ̂
0
T+1(x)]
= lim inf
n→∞
E
[
ŷ(x)Z0,nT
(∑T+1
k=1
(
∆ϕ̂0k(x) +
Z1,n
k−1
Z0,n
k−1
∆ϕ̂1k(x)
))]
+ xŷ(x)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
E
[
ŷ(x)Z0,nT
(∑T+1
k=1
(
∆ϕ̂0k(x) +
Z1,n
k−1
Z0,n
k−1
∆ϕ̂1k(x)
))]
+ xŷ(x)
≤ E
[
Ŷ 0T
(
ŷ(x)
)(∑T+1
k=1
(
∆ϕ̂0k(x) +
Ŷ 1
k−1
(ŷ(x))
Ŷ 0
k−1
(ŷ(x))
∆ϕ̂1k(x)
))]
+ xŷ(x)
and therefore that ∆ϕ̂0k(x) +
Ŷ 1
k−1
(ŷ(x))
Ŷ 0
k−1
(ŷ(x))
∆ϕ̂1k(x) = 0 for k = 1, . . . , T + 1, which yields the
assertion.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Suppose that (Ŷ 0, Ŷ 1) ∈ B
(
ŷ(x)
)
is a martingale. Then, the pro-
cess Ŷ 0ϕ0 + Ŷ 1ϕ1 = Ŷ 0
(
x + ϕ1 • Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
is a non-negative local martingale and hence a
supermartingale for all (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A
(
x; Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
,8 which implies that Ŷ 0 ∈ Y
(
ŷ(x); Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
. As
ϕ̂0T+1 = (U
′)−1(Ŷ 0T ), we have Ŷ
0
T = U
′(ϕ̂0T+1), and Ŷ
0ϕ̂0 + Ŷ 1ϕ̂1 = Ŷ 0
(
x + ϕ̂1 • Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
is a
martingale by Theorem 4.2, we obtain by the duality for the frictionless utility maximiza-
tion problem, i.e., Theorem 2.2 in [17], that (ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) ∈ A
(
x; Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
and Ŷ 0 ∈ Y
(
ŷ(x); Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
are the solutions to the frictionless primal and dual problem for Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
, if ŷ(x; Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
) = ŷ(x).
To see the latter, we observe that u(x) = v
(
ŷ(x)
)
+ xŷ(x) by Theorem 4.2 and therefore
v
(
ŷ(x)
)
+ xŷ(x) = u(x) ≤ u
(
x; Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
≤ v
(
ŷ(x); Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
+ xŷ(x) by (2.3). Since v
(
ŷ(x)
)
=
E
[
V (Ŷ 0T )
]
, E[ϕ̂0T+1Ŷ
0
T ] = xŷ(x) and Ŷ
0 ∈ Y
(
ŷ(x); Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
)
, we obtain that ŷ(x; Ŷ
1
Ŷ 0
) = ŷ(x),
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. As the solution (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(x; Ŝ) to (2.4) exists by the definition
of a shadow price, we obtain that Ŝ = (Ŝ)Tt=0 is arbitrage-free. To see this, suppose that
there exists an arbitrage opportunity. Since we are in finite discrete time, the existence of
an arbitrage opportunity is equivalent to the existence of an arbitrage opportunity (ξ0, ξ1)
in one period. Adding this (as in the proof of Theorem 3.3 in [10]) to the solution (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈
A(x; Ŝ) to (2.4) yields a strategy with a strictly higher expected utility, i.e., E[U(ϕ0T+1)] <
E
[
U
(
(ϕ0 + ξ0)T+1
)]
. As (ϕ0 + ξ0, ϕ1 + ξ1) ∈ A(x; Ŝ), this contradicts the assumption that
8Note that this argument fails in general if the dual minimizer is a strict supermartingale, unless negative
risky positions are ruled out by short selling constraints as in [18, 1]
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(ϕ0, ϕ1) is the solution to (2.4) and hence proves that Ŝ is arbitrage-free. By the fundamental
theorem of asset pricing [6] this implies the existence of an equivalent martingale measure
Q for Ŝ and therefore that Y(y; Ŝ) 6= ∅ for all y > 0. As Ŝ is valued in the bid-ask spread
[(1 − λ)S, S], any (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈ A(x) is also self-financing for Ŝ without frictions (λ = 0) and
hence A(x) ⊆ A(x; Ŝ). Since A(x) ⊆ A(x; Ŝ), we obtain that (Y 0, Y 1) := (Y, Y Ŝ) ∈ B(y)
for all Y ∈ Y(y; Ŝ) and therefore similarly to (2.3):
v(y) = inf
(Y 0,Y 1)∈B(y)
E[V (Y 0T )] ≤ inf
Y ∈Y(y;Ŝ)
E[V (YT )] =: v(y; Ŝ). (B.1)
Moreover, as
u(x) = v
(
ŷ(x)
)
+xŷ(x) ≤ v
(
ŷ(x; Ŝ)
)
+xŷ(x; Ŝ) ≤ v
(
ŷ(x; Ŝ); Ŝ
)
+xŷ(x; Ŝ) = u(x; Ŝ) = u(x),
it follows that ŷ(x) = ŷ(x; Ŝ) and therefore that (Ŷ 0, Ŷ 1) := (Ŷ , Ŷ Ŝ) ∈ B
(
ŷ(x)
)
is the
solution to the frictional dual problem (4.2), where Ŷ ∈ Y
(
ŷ(x; Ŝ)
)
is the solution to its
frictionless counterpart (4.1) for Ŝ.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. In analogy to the primal problem, we introduce a two-dimensional
objective function
V(x, y) :=
{
V (x) : y ≥ 0 and x > 0,
+∞ : else
for the dual problem (4.2) that is then given by
E[V(Y 0T , Y
1
T )]→ max!, (Y
0, Y 1) ∈ B(y). (B.2)
For a dynamic formulation of (B.2) we set B(Y 0, Y 1; t) = {(Y˜ 0, Y˜ 1) ∈ B(y) | (Y˜ 0s , Y˜
1
s ) =
(Y 0s , Y
1
s ) for s = 0, . . . , t} for (Y
0, Y 1) ∈ B(y) and
Vt(Y
0, Y 1) := ess inf
(Y˜ 0,Y˜ 1)∈B(Y 0,Y 1;t)
E
[
V(Y˜ 0T , Y˜
1
T )
∣∣Ft].9
By the martingale optimality principle we then have Ut(ϕ̂
0
t , ϕ̂
1
t ) = E
[
U(ϕ̂0T+1, ϕ̂
1
T+1
)∣∣Ft] for
the solution (ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) to (4.4) and Vt(Ŷ
0, Ŷ 1) = E
[
V(Ŷ 0T , Ŷ
1
T
)∣∣Ft] for the solution (Ŷ 0, Ŷ 1) to
(B.2). Now, by Fenchel’s inequality, we have
U
(
ψ0+(ϕ˜0T+1−ϕ˜
0
t ), ψ
1+(ϕ˜1T+1−ϕ˜
1
t )
)
≤ V(Ŷ 0T , Ŷ
1
T )+
(
ψ0+(ϕ˜0T+1−ϕ˜
0
t )
)
Ŷ 0T+
(
ψ1+(ϕ˜1T+1−ϕ˜
1
t )
)
Ŷ 1T
for all (ϕ˜0, ϕ˜1) ∈ A and U(ϕ̂0T+1) = U(ϕ̂
0
T+1, ϕ̂
1
T+1) = V(Ŷ
0
T , Ŷ
1
T ) + ϕ̂
0
T+1Ŷ
0
T + ϕ̂
1
T+1Ŷ
1
T for
(ϕ̂0, ϕ̂1) by part 3) of Theorem 4.2. Taking conditional expectations and optimizing in the
above equation gives
Ut(ψ
0, ψ1) ≤ Vt(Ŷ
0, Ŷ 1) + ψ0Ŷ 0t + ψ
1Ŷ 1t (B.3)
and
Ut(ϕ̂
0
t , ϕ̂
1
t ) = Vt(Ŷ
0, Ŷ 1) + ϕ̂0t Ŷ
0
t + ϕ̂
1
t Ŷ
1
t (B.4)
9Note that the definition of Ut and Vt is slightly asymmetric, as the set A is – in contrast to the set B(y)
– stable under concatenation.
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by the martingale optimality principle. In (B.3) we exploit that there either exists (ϕ0, ϕ1) ∈
A(x˜) for some x˜ > 0 such that (ϕ0T+1, ϕ
1
T+1) =
(
ψ0+(ϕ˜0T+1− ϕ˜
0
t ), ψ
1+(ϕ˜1T+1− ϕ˜
1
t )
)
and that
(Ŷ 0t ϕ
0
t+1 + Ŷ
1
t ϕ
1
t+1)
T
t=0 is a supermartingale with E[Ŷ
0
T ϕ
0
T+1 + Ŷ
1
Tϕ
1
T+1|Ft] ≤ Ŷ
0
t ψ
0 + Ŷ 1t ψ
1
or the inequality is trivially satisfied with Ut(ψ
0, ψ1) = −∞, if no such (ϕ0, ϕ1) exists.
Combining (B.3) and (B.4) then implies (4.5), i.e., that
Ut(ψ
0, ψ1) ≤ Ut(ϕ̂
0
t , ϕ̂
1
t ) + (ψ
0 − ϕ̂0t )Ŷ
0
t + (ψ
1 − ϕ̂1t )Ŷ
1
t ,
a.s. for all (ψ0, ψ1) ∈ L0(Ω,Ft, P ;R
2).
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